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expense, inadequate Government-business dialogue, and unnecessarily
great difficulties of adjustment to the new statutes. It seems inevitable to
the writer that these difficulties will continue while reliance continues to
be placed on committees with wide terms of reference. The answer
seems to lie in the assumption by those with political responsibility of
the duty to determine the areas where proven deficiencies exist and to
delineate for the expert committees terms of reference that are limited to
those areas. In this way the benefits of expert committees can be retained
while the above-mentioned difficulties are minimized.
James C. Baillie*
Manitoba Law Reform Commission Working Paper on Fire
Insurance
Proposals for the reform of automobile insurance to one side, it is only
very infrequently that one sees suggestions put forward for the reform of
any branch of insurance law. For this reason alone, one is pleased to see
the report of the Manitoba Law Reform Commission on Fire Insurance.
The report is an interesting one but its tentative character makes it a
difficult one to evaluate. The report itself states that it is a preliminary to
a wider and more ambitious survey. In pointing out gaps in the
Commission's analysis, one runs the risk of dealing with matters with
which the full report will deal.
The Commission begins by making the recommendation that an
unnamed insured should be given the right to sue on a policy. It is
impossible to disagree with this recommendation but surely, the prob-
lem here is only part of the wider problem of defining insurable interest
in property insurance. The extremely unsatisfactory nature of the law
relating to insurable interest is noted in the conclusion' but no recom-
mendation is made. It is difficult to see that the problem is either very
difficult, or that the correct solution is particularly difficult to find. All
that has to be done is to codify Lawrence, J.'s statement of the principle
inLucena v. Craufurd.2 To do this would do no more than bring the law
into line with commercial reality and common sense. 3
* Of the Ontario Bar.
'See pp. 93-94.
2 (1808), 1 Taunt. 325, 127 E.R. 858.
See Bertram Harnett and John Thornton, "Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic
Reevaluation of a Legal Concept", 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1162 (1948).
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The Commission then proposes that the distinction between "hos-
tile" and "friendly" fires should be abolished 4 and it is impossible to
quarrel with this recommendation. The Commission does not deal as
well with the question of non-occupancy; here it recommends retention
of the existing law. Most policies provide that non-occupancy of
premises for more than 30 days will defeat the occupier's recovery. The
Commission seems to recognize the difficulty that most people would
think that non-occupancy would tend to decrease the risk but the
Commission makes no proposals for change. One would like to have
seen the Commission explore with the insurance industry the possibility
of providing that non-occupancy provisions did not defeat recovery but
individual companies could, if they desired, provide that they were not
to be liable for fires deliberately caused by third parties. The Commis-
sion would also allow insurers to defeat recovery, even in the absence of
a specified period of non-occupancy, by showing that the risk had in fact
increased because of non-occupancy. 5 Two comments suggest them-
selves here: first, if non-occupancy is to be treated as increasing the risk,
the insured should be given notice of this. Second, consideration should
be given in an increase-of-risk situation to the adoption of a proportion-
ate recovery rule, as is done in accident and sickness insurance.
In dealing with the assignment of insurance policies, the Commission
endorses the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Springfield
Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Maxim Eagle Fire Co. of New York v.
Maxim, 6 and recommends that the effect of that decision be translated
into legislation. According to the Commission the effect of Maxim is to
make the insurance policy assignable to the purchaser who takes the
benefit of the policy but is not subject to any of the defences which might
have been raised against the vendor. Unfortunately, the Commission has
misunderstood the Maxim case; that case did not deal with assignment at
all, but rather with novation. There is no need to have a statutory
provision which allows for a novation to take place. What one would
like to see is the codification of James, L.J.'s dissenting judgment in
Rayner v. Preston, 7 the effect of which would be to make the vendor a
4 Compare Harris v. Poland, [1941] 1 K.B. 462 with Young v. Waterloo Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., [1955] I.L.R. para. 1-202.
5 See Sun Insurance Office of London, England v. Roy; Guardian Life Assurance Company of
London, England v. Roy, [1927] 1 D.L.R. 17, [1927] S.C.R. 8.
6 [1946] 4 D.L.R. 369, [1946] S.C.R. 604, 13 I.L.R. 108.
7 (1881), 18 Ch.D. I (C.A.).
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constructive trustee with regard to the purchaser of any monies received
from the insurer. It may well be that s. 40 of the Law of Property Act,
R.S.M. 1970, c. L90 which gives the Court of Queen's Bench power to
direct the application of any monies received or receivable under any
insurance policy, achieves the same result as James, L.J.'s dissent in
Rayner v. Preston but it would be helpful if the court were to be given
guidelines in deciding how to apply the monies. It would also be helpful
ifs. 40 of the Law of Property Act could be placed in the relevant part of
the Insurance Act.
The Commission's analysis of subrogation is disappointing; we are
told that subrogation "serves, in part, to prevent an insured from being
owner-indemnified for a loss". 8 This function is a highly desirable one
with which it is impossible to quarrel. But subrogation also serves the
function - in a very expensive manner - of shifting losses to other
insurers and to uninsured persons who often cannot be expected to
shoulder the very heavy burden which is imposed on them. Perhaps the
best example of a class of persons who cannot reasonably be expected to
shoulder the burdens that subrogation imposes are tenants. 9 It is remark-
able that the Commission does not consider this aspect of the doctrine.
Instead, the Commission spends all its time discussing the position of
the insurer who has indemnified someone who has under-insured his
property. At present, the insurer may in such a situation sue the
tortfeasor and the proceeds of recovery are to be divided between the
insurer and the insured in proportion to their loss. The Commission
wishes to change this rule so that, in future, the proceeds of recovery will
be applied to indemnify the insured fully for the loss he has suffered and
the balance (if any) will go to the insurer. This change will, most likely,
act as a disincentive to insurers from pursuing their subrogation rights. If
insurers do not pursue their subrogation rights, will they be liable to their
insureds for breach of duty? It is suggested that the most satisfactory rule
is the old common law rule which gave the insurer no subrogation rights
in a case of under-insurance. 10
8 See Report at p. 27.
9 See, generally, Milton R. Friedman, "Landlords, Tenants and Fires - Insurer's Right of
Subrogation", 43 Cornell L.Q. 225 (1957), and note the unfortunate Ontario decisions in
Pyrotech Prod. Ltd. v. Ross Southward Tire Ltd. (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 168, and Cummer-
Yonge Inv. Ltd. v. Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd., [ 1972] I.L.R. 1461, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 501,
[1972] 2 O.R. 341, revd in part 55 D.L.R. (3d) 676, 4 N.R. 547 (S.C.C.).
10 See Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Truedell, [ 1927] 2 D.L.R. 659, 60 0. L. R. 227 (Ont.
C.A.).
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The Commission is on sounder ground when it recommends a number
of other changes; instead of notice of loss having to be given "forth-
with", it is recommended that it should be given "within a reasonable
time". Further, notice of loss need no longer be given in writing.
The Commission also, rightly, recommends that the limitation period
be increased from one year to two years. Even with a two-year limitation
period, it would be wise to give the courts a dispensing power so as to
enable the insured to bring his action even after two years, where it was
"not reasonably practicable" for him to bring his action within the
two-year period. "
The discussion of the limitation period leads, naturally enough, to the
question of relief from forfeiture. Here, the Commission is very
ambitious. It would replace the present anti-forfeiture provisions which
apply only to duties imposed on the insured after loss with the general
s. 63, Rule 7 of the Queen's Bench Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C180, which
would give the courts a general power to relieve against forfeitures. The
difficulty with this solution is that it would give too much discretion to
the courts and make the law overly complex; the courts would be given a
dispensing power in the areas, for example, of misrepresentation and
increase of risk when it should be possible to devise fair rules for these
areas without the need for a general dispensing power as a back-up. It is
submitted that all the difficulties the Commission instances could be
dealt with by making two minor verbal changes to s. 130 of the
Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. 140. First, instead of "imperfect
compliance", the statute should provide "imperfect compliance or a
failure to comply". Second, "statutory condition" should be changed
so that it provides for all conditions - statutory and non-statutory.
The Report is at its best when discussing the present chaos surround-
ing waiver and estoppel. It shows how some courts have contorted the
law in order to evade the statutory rule that a waiver must be in writing.
The Commission sensibly recommends the abolition of the rule and a
prohibition of any waiver-in-writing clauses in future policies.
Unfortunately this excellent discussion is followed by a thoroughly
unsatisfactory analysis of misrepresentations and warranties. The
1 "One example of where it would not be "reasonably practicable" for the insured to bring a claim
within the requisite period is the situation where the insurer persuades the insured not to bring an
action because the company says it will settle without the need for litigation. If the insured does
not begin an action in these circumstances and the limitation period has run out without the
insurer having paid, relief should be given to the insured.
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Commission recommends that before an insurer can avoid a policy for
misrepresentation it must show that the misrepresentation was made
fraudulently. The Commission takes this view because, otherwise, an
insured might be penalized for making an innocent misrepresentation.
But "innocent" misrepresentations come in all shapes and forms and it
seems wrong not to distinguish between them. Surely, there is a
difference between a man who writes down an incorrect answer after
making reasonable inquiries and the man who writes down an incorrect
answer without bothering to make any inquiries. Both men are "inno-
cent" in that neither intends to defraud the insurance company but their
merits are very different. It is submitted that the first insured should
receive full recovery and the second insured should - at most - receive
proportionate recovery. One's sense of mystification deepens when the
Commission proposes that for warranties, as opposed to misrepresenta-
tions, the insurer can avoid simply on grounds of materiality! Why there
should be such a vast difference in the legal consequences between
warranties and misrepresentations when the two concepts are function-
ally identical, defies comprehension.
With regard to non-disclosure, the Commission wishes to undertake a
study to determine whether the doctrine of uberrimafides has outlived
its usefulness but in the meanwhile, it supports the present rule whereby
fraudulent non-disclosure entitles the insurer to avoid the policy. 12 It is
difficult to believe that insurers feel strongly about this; had they done
so, they would have made efforts (as they have done successfully in the
field of subrogation) to have the law changed. It is difficult to believe
that the notion is of much use to insurers. There does not appear to be a
reported case since 193513 where the defence has been successfully
invoked. Perhaps this is due, in part, to the fact that the whole notion of
fraudulent non-disclosure is a curious one. Fraud, at least in its normal
meaning, suggests the doing of a positive act with the intention of
misleading someone and in the fraudulent non-disclosure cases, the
insurer cannot point to such a positive act.
The Commission ends its report by discussing the legal status of
intermediaries (agents and brokers). The Commission is, rightly, highly
critical of the pernicious rule in Newsholme's1 4 case which holds that
when an agent fills in the proposal form he is acting as an agent for the
12 See Taylor v. London Assurance Corp., [1935] 3D.L.R. 129,[1935] S.C.R. 422, 2 1.L.R. 252.
13 This is the date of the Taylor case (see previous note) when the present law was laid down.
14 Newsholme Bros. v. Road Transport and General Insurance Co., Ltd., [ 1929] 2 K.B. 356.
258 Canadian Business Law Journal
insured. The decision inNewsholme's case rests, not as the Commission
seems to think, on any notions of authority, but rather on the notion that
insureds should be bound by documents they sign. As Scrutton, L.J.,
said in Newsholme:
I have great difficulty in understanding how a man who has signed, without
reading it, a document which he knows to be a proposal for insurance, and which
contains statements in fact untrue, and a promise that they are true, and the basis of
the contract, can escape from the consequences of his negligence by saying that the
person he asked to fill it up for him is the agent of the person to whom the proposal is
addressed. 15
There can be no doubt that if Newsholme were reversed there would
be some undeserving beneficiaries from the change, but the Commis-
sion is entirely correct in suggesting that the time has come for insurance
companies to be answerable for the misdeeds of their agents. In view of
the fact that the courts seem to regard brokers, as opposed to agents, as
being agents of the insured, 16 it would probably be advisable to make an
express reference to brokers in the statute. Unfortunately, statutory
provisions such as the one proposed by the Commission, have been




Whatever disagreements one might have about particular recommen-
dations, the Report is to be welcomed as a serious attempt to deal with a
difficult and neglected branch of the law. It is to be hoped that Law
Reform Commissions in other provinces will emulate the Manitoba
example and review their insurance law. Platitudes about "highly
regulated industries" are no substitute for searching and critical
analyses. 18 R. A. Hasson*
15 Ibid., at p. 376.
16 See, e.g., Anglo-African Merchants v. Bayley, [1970] 1 Q.B. 311. But cf. the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Okanagan Mainline Real Estate Board
(1970), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 715, [1971] S.C.R. 493, [1971] i W.W.R. 289, which indicates that,
for some purposes at least, the courts will treat a broker as an agent of the insurer.
1 See, e.g., Sleigh v. Stevenson, [1943]4 D.L.R. 433, 10 I.L.R. 287, [1943] O.W.N. 287 and
Boutilier v. Traders General Insurance Co., (1969), 7 D.L.R. (3d) 220, [1966-70] I.L.R. 815,
[ 1969] IL. R. 1-299, in which decisions the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal, respectively, nullified statutory provisions similar to the one recommended by the
Commission.
's Although I have tried in the present note to comment on matters dealt with by the Commission I
cannot forbear from mentioning one glaring omission from the Commission's Report. There is
no discussion of the extremely important problem of valuation. It is greatly to be hoped that the
Commission will deal with this extremely important subject in their final report.
*Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
